Updated: 2026-10-31 4:57 AM | Popularity: 629 [Epoch Times, October 29, 2026] (Epoch Times reporters Zhuang Aijun and Zhang Yuanzhang, Taipei, Taiwan) According to the latest statistics, last year Taiwan had 47,000 suspected drug offenders and seized over 13,000 kilograms of drugs, a record high in recent years. A staggering 92% of the precursor chemicals came from China, from “meow meow” to “zombie smoke bombs,” making the mainland the largest source of Taiwan’s drug supply chain. Experts urge Taiwan to learn from the US experience, regard the CCP as a key risk source, comprehensively upgrade border control, expand preventative controls, and elevate the fight against dark web payments to a national-level anti-drug strategy to cut off cross-border drug chains.
The drug problem remains intractable. Initially dominated by opioids like heroin, it evolved with the rise of amphetamines, ketamine, and ecstasy. In recent years, several new drugs have emerged, most notably drug-laced coffee packets containing the Schedule III drug “mephedrone” and etomidate, commonly known as “zombie smoke bombs.”
According to the National Police Agency, 47,322 drug suspects were apprehended last year, an increase of 9,468 from the previous year, representing a 25.01% year-on-year increase and a five-year high. The weight of drugs seized reached 13,217.08 kilograms, a 17.02% year-on-year increase.
Over 90% of drug precursors originate from China.
According to the Ministry of Justice, of the 12,581.7 kilograms of precursors to Schedule IV drugs seized last year, 11,556.6 kilograms originated from China, accounting for approximately 92%. The situation regarding precursors for emerging drugs originating from China is potentially even more serious. The Criminal Investigation Bureau pointed out that the precursors needed to manufacture “Meow Meow,” a Schedule III drug currently heavily used in Taiwan, are almost entirely smuggled into the country from China, then processed and packaged into drug-laced coffee packets in domestic drug manufacturing plants.
A similar situation has occurred with etomidate. In recent years, the Coast Guard Administration and the Investigation Bureau have also seized precursors such as “2-mercaptoetomidate” and etomidate acid smuggled from China.
“By obtaining precursors for drugs from China, Taiwan is gradually becoming a drug processing center,” Wu Hsin-tai, a Taipei City councilor candidate and physician, told the Epoch Times. He added that Taoyuan had previously uncovered cases of drug manufacturers learning drug manufacturing methods from mainland drug traffickers online, forming a criminal model where “raw materials and technology enter from overseas, while manufacturing and sales take place in Taiwan.”
The difficulty in cutting off the supply of drug precursors from overseas lies in the differences in regulations and the upgrading of smuggling methods. Wu Hsin-tai pointed out that current laws only regulate specific substances, allowing drug trafficking groups to exploit loopholes by importing unregulated precursor materials for processing in Taiwan. Simultaneously, criminal groups smuggle thousands of kilograms of drug precursors under false declarations such as “cosmetic ingredients,” or transship them through third countries like Vietnam and Malaysia, significantly increasing the difficulty of drug enforcement and investigation.
Dark Web and Cryptocurrency Connect Cross-Border Financial Flows
Cross-border financial flows present another challenge for investigation. In July, the Investigation Bureau dismantled the Four Seas Gang money laundering syndicate, which consolidated illicit proceeds from drugs, fraud, and gambling into “packages” and transferred over US$270 million overseas between 2024 and 2025. The overseas receiving companies included Chinese enterprises.
Furthermore, a large amount of illicit funds are transferred through cryptocurrencies. According to police observations, in recent years, up to 80% of money laundering cases involving cross-border crimes have used cryptocurrencies as the transfer interface.
Wang Po-chi, Associate Professor of the Department of Criminal Justice at Ming Chuan University, pointed out in an interview with *The Epoch Times* that the development of the dark web and cryptocurrencies has made drug trafficking and cross-border financial flows more covert. In the past, money flows could be traced through bank transfers, but with the dark web and encrypted wallets, investigative technology may not be able to keep up, leading to gaps in the upstream investigation. Furthermore, physical drugs can still be smuggled in via fishing boats, containers, or other means, creating a network linking online transactions, cross-border payments, and physical smuggling, making it a breeding ground for illicit financial flows.
Existing investigation results show that the drug supply chain involves “people, goods, and funds all moving across borders.” Wu Hsin-tai stated frankly that this is currently the biggest challenge facing Taiwan’s drug enforcement efforts.
The CCP’s unwillingness to cooperate further complicates Taiwan’s efforts to curb the drug epidemic. Wu Hsin-tai said that the National Security Bureau has indicated that Taiwan has attempted to exchange relevant intelligence with China, but the other side’s passive attitude and lack of proactive response highlight the mainland government’s lack of attention to this issue.
Learning from the US Strategy: Severing the Financial Supply Chain
The US faces the same problem. Wu Hsin-tai stated that a US House of Representatives investigation report accused the CCP of “directly subsidizing” the production and export of fentanyl precursors through export tax rebates and other measures. Furthermore, while the US requested CCP cooperation in investigating Chinese companies, the CCP would secretly instruct them to evade investigations, making it difficult to trace the source.
However, the US has taken a different approach. By expanding controls, including the “precursor materials” for synthesizing fentanyl and equipment such as tableting machines on the export control list, and imposing financial sanctions, the US has frozen the assets of suspected Chinese chemical companies and individuals, and cut off their dollar settlement channels. In addition, the US has targeted Chinese suppliers’ drug trafficking advertisements and Bitcoin payment accounts posted on the dark web, and conducted entrapment operations and cracked down on money laundering networks, comprehensively combating drugs and precursors from China.
Wu Hsin-tai emphasized that Taiwan should deeply learn from the US’s attitude and strategy in dealing with the CCP’s drug supply chain. When dealing with the sources of drugs from overseas, “the Chinese government itself should be considered the primary source of national security and crime risks, and border and financial controls should be comprehensively strengthened, rather than relying on the other side to proactively cooperate with law enforcement,” she added. She further stated that in the future, national security and law enforcement agencies should elevate “cross-border virtual currency money laundering investigation” and “dark web phishing enforcement” to the core of the national anti-drug strategy.
Regarding the difficulties in tracing the sources of drugs in Taiwan, Wang Po-Chi stated that maritime smuggling cannot be intercepted ship by ship, and air and sea cargo mainly relies on risk management and random inspections. Without intelligence, drugs or precursor materials may be concealed within normal cargo such as containers, forcing law enforcement agencies to often only detect them at the end and then trace them upstream.
However, there is still room for improvement in Taiwan’s overseas prevention measures. He suggested that the government could adjust the intensity of inspections based on the source region and the risk of the goods, increasing the random inspection rate for high-risk sources. After the raw materials enter the country, the government could also strengthen the management of the purchase, usage, and flow of finished products in legal chemical laboratories to reduce the possibility of legal equipment or facilities being used for drug production.
Regarding domestic drug manufacturing sites, Wang Po-Chi pointed out that some drug factories have previously been hidden in remote or abandoned buildings. He suggested considering using technologies such as drones to inventory long-term idle locations, increasing the chances of discovering suspicious sites.
Regarding regulations, Wang Po-Chi advocated for an assessment of expanding the scope of control over precursor raw materials for high-risk drugs such as etomidate and amphetamines. He also proposed including substances with similar chemical structures in the assessment to prevent the government from belatedly listing emerging substances after they have caused harm. He believes that the current system often only lists drugs after they have emerged, easily falling into the trap of “locking the stable door after the horse has bolted.” He advocated for expanding controls proactively within a clearly defined risk range, and then delisting drugs only when necessary based on actual risk.

